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This paper investigates whether large non-bank institutional investors herded
during the dot-com bubble of the 1990s. We use the vector Markov-switching
model of Hamilton and Lin (1996) to analyze the technology stock holdings of 115
large institutional investors from 1980 to 2012. By imposing different restrictions
on the elements of the transition probability matrix, we are able to test for various
lead/lag scenarios that might have existed between the technology stock holding
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the investors in our sample herded during the dot-com bubble. Thus, during the
dot-com bubble, herding among large institutional investors was not an especially
widespread phenomenon. Among those investors that herded, 80% herded during
the run-up, 10% during the collapse, and 10% during both phases of the dot-com
bubble. About 23% of all investors in our sample exited from the technology
sector before the bubble collapsed. These results seem to support Abbreu and
Brunnermeier’s (2003) theory of bubbles and crashes.
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Did Large Institutional Investors Flock into the Technology Herd?
An Empirical Investigation Using a Vector Markov-Switching Model
I. Introduction
Herding in financial markets is often defined as the behavioral tendency of an in-
vestor to follow the actions and investment strategies of others.1 In this paper we
look for traces of one particular type of herding that Choi and Sias (2009) define as
industry herding, the tendency of investors to follow others into or out of a given
industry’s stocks over some period of time. Herding can lead to persistent devia-
tions of asset prices from their fundamental values, inefficient distribution of capital,
excess volatility,2 asset bubbles, and crashes. Since herding distorts the risk-return
distribution in asset markets, it also has important implications for asset pricing
models. There is a vast amount of literature that documents at least some evidence
of herding in financial markets.3 If herding is pervasive among large institutional in-
vestors,4 then we posit that all of the above problems would be exacerbated because
the proportion of the stock market capitalization managed by institutional investors
has steadily increased from around 7% in the 1950s to nearly 67% in 2010.5 It
is not surprising that this growing importance of institutional investors has led to
a recent upsurge in the literature that investigates herding behavior among them.
Lakonishok et al. (1992), proposed a (LCV) metric for gauging herding and positive
feedback trading practices among investors. Using this metric, they examined herd-
ing behavior among US pension funds between 1985 and 1989 and found that during
this period pension funds herded relatively little. Recognizing that the original LCV
metric may suffer from few shortcomings, Wylie (2005), Andreu et al. (2009), and
1Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000).
2See, for example, Blasco et al. (2012).
3See, for example, Andronikidi and Kallinterakis (2010), Ben-David et al. (2012), Billio et al.
(2012), Choi and Sias (2009), Guo and Shih (2008), Khandani and Lo (2011). Haiss (2005)
offers an overview of the related literature.
4Institutional investors include but are not limited to pension funds, endowment funds, insurance
companies, commercial banks, mutual funds, and hedge funds. These investors exhibit industry
herding when the money managers who operate under the umbrella of a larger institution
collectively tilt their portfolios toward a particular industry. See Frazzini and Lamont (2008)
5Blume and Keim (2012).
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Huang et al. (2010) modified the metric and analyzed the herd behavior among pen-
sion and mutual fund managers in different international markets. All three studies
found that investors tend to herd in their respective markets. Wermers (1999) ana-
lyzed the trading activity of the mutual fund industry from 1975 through 1994 and
found little evidence of herding in the average stock and much higher levels in trades
of small stocks and in trading by growth-oriented funds. Nofsinger and Sias (1999)
found that institutional investors herd more than individual investors. Sias (2004)
and Choi and Sias (2009) examined the dynamics of institutional portfolio holdings
and found strong evidence of herding. Finally, a study by Reca et al. (2012) con-
cluded that hedge fund managers herd much less than other types of institutional
investors.
As the above synopsis of the related literature suggests, evidence on institutional
herding is inconclusive and context specific. One branch of the literature examines
investor herding behavior during the technology (dot-com) bubble 1998–2000. Brun-
nermeier and Nagel (2004), for example, examined the trading behavior of hedge
funds during this period and found that hedge funds actively purchased technology
stocks during the run-up of the bubble and quickly reversed the course shortly before
March 2000 when the bubble collapsed. Griffin et al. (2011) reached a similar con-
clusion for a broader group of institutional investors. Both studies found evidence
that before the market peaked in March 2000, institutional investors engaged in
feedback trading and followed the trades of other sophisticated market participants.
The notion of herding in financial markets is closely related to and goes against the
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) of Friedman (1953) and Fama (1965). Accord-
ing to the EMH, rational arbitrageurs would normally bet against overpriced market
segments and by doing so drive asset prices back to their fundamentals. The EMH
implies that bubbles in asset markets form only when rational investors remain per-
sistently agnostic about overly inflated asset prices. On the other hand, if markets
are in fact inefficient, bubbles may form due to market frictions, such as short-
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sell constraints,6 agency problems,7 or other frictions, that prevent investors from
betting against overinflated assets. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) propose that
because of capital constraints, individual rational investors may be unable to drive
market prices down even when they are aware of the bubble. Furthermore, they have
an incentive to herd and continue investing in overvalued assets (ride on the bub-
ble) as long as there is a common belief that positive-feedback trades will continue
pushing the prices of those assets up. Thus, Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) view
asset bubbles as a coordination problem. Bubbles eventually collapse when com-
mon knowledge among arbitrageurs about overvalued assets reaches critical mass
and the trend reverses to a coordinated sell-off of these assets. Both, Brunnermeier
and Nagel (2004) and Griffin et al. (2011) provide evidence that institutional in-
vestors were well aware of the bubble around the implosion of the technology stock
prices and many of them exited this sector before the bubble collapsed. This finding
is in line with and supports the hypothesis of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003).
Our study is another empirical inquiry into the hypothesis that Abreu and Brun-
nermeier (2003) propose. We investigate whether and to what extent large institu-
tional investors herded during the buildup and collapse of the dot-com bubble of
the 1990s. We consider a unique sample of 115 large US institutional investors and
the evolution of each investor’s technology stock portfolio prior to, during, and after
the bubble. Using a vector Markov-switching model of Hamilton and Lin (1996), we
formally test whether technology investment regimes of each investor in our sample
led or lagged the technology investment regimes of all other investors in the sample.
Thus, one of the important goals of this study is to demonstrate that during an
asset bubble, certain transition probabilities in a vector Markov-switching model
can be conveniently used to gauge investor herding behavior. Our results indicate
that while overall institutional herding was not an especially pervasive phenomenon,
herding was much more prevalent during the run-up of the bubble than during the
collapse. Only 20 out of 115 investors in our sample (or 17.4%) herded during the
6See, for example, Scheinkman and Xiong (2003).
7See, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
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bubble. Within these 20, 16 (13.9% of the sample) herded during the buildup, 2
(1.7% of the sample) after the collapse, and 2 during both phases of the bubble. 27
(or 23%) investors exited from the technology sector before the bubble collapsed.
These results indicate that many sophisticated rational speculators were probably
well aware of the bubble even though they rode on it during the buildup. Our results
are in strong agreement with those obtained by Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and
Griffin et al. (2011) and also support Abreu and Brunnermeier’s (2003) hypothesis
of rational asset bubbles.
This study contributes to the literature from at least two different dimensions.
First, we propose a new formal empirical test for detecting herding behavior among
investors during an asset bubble. As we mentioned above, certain estimated transi-
tion probabilities in our vector Markov-switching model may be reflective of investor
herding behavior. Using this particular feature of the model, we manage to formally
test whether the portfolio regimes of a given investor led, lagged, or coincided with
the portfolio regimes of all other sample investors during the dot-com bubble. One
attractive feature of our approach is that unlike most other existing methods, our
methodology allows for disaggregated (investor-level) analysis of herding behavior.
Using our methodology, one can test whether any given investor in the sample ex-
hibited any signs of herding behavior. Subsequently, after considering every investor
in the sample, it is straightforward to aggregate the results and use them for the
analysis of market-wide herding trends. Our approach to detecting investor herding
is novel and, to the best of our knowledge, has not yet been explored in the related
literature. The second contribution of our study is related to the uniqueness of the
sample of investors that we consider. Our sample consists of 115 largest institutional
investors. These are perhaps some of the most sophisticated and rational investors.
Thus, our results provide additional empirical evidence regarding herding behavior
among some of the most sophisticated and rational investors.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II explains our data and
methodology. Section III describes the empirical results. Section IV concludes.
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II. Data and Methodology
Since 1978, all financial institutions and managers with $100 million or more under
management are required to file quarterly SEC 13(f) reports of their large long po-
sitions in exchange-traded or NASDAQ-quoted equity. We retrieved all the reports
filed between January 1980 and September 2012 (130 quarters) from the Thomson
Reuters database8 that contained about 218,000 filings by 6,212 distinct investors.9
Since our goal is to investigate herding behavior among large institutional investors,
we concentrated on large investors whose equity portfolio in September 2012 was at
least $1 billion and who by September 2012 had at least 80 quarters of continuous
data. By focusing on this particular group of investors, we hope to take advantage
of the possible survivorship bias. Since investors in our sample turned out to be the
largest at the end, prevalence of herding among them indirectly implies that herding
in general may be a successful investment strategy.
The Thomson Reuters database classifies each 13(f) investor into one of the fol-
lowing five categories: banks, insurance companies, investment companies and their
managers, independent investment advisors, and all others. In this study, we limited
our attention to the latter two.10,11 Hence, our sample consists of large independent
investment advisors and other uncategorized investment companies that by Septem-
ber 2012 had at least 80 quarters of continuous data and at least $1 billion under
8This database is in turn available from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).
9Investors in the Thomson Reuters database may over time change their reporting status. This
may happen when the nature of their operations changes or when new information becomes
available. Because of this, there are more distinct manager numbers in the database than
reporting institutions. Here we report the number of unique manager numbers.
10The ‘independent investment advisors’ category includes mostly asset management companies,
investment banks, brokers, and private wealth management companies. The category ‘all oth-
ers’ includes mostly pension funds, endowment funds, most of the hedge funds, and financial
arms of corporations.
11Reca et al. (2012) identify at least four limitations of using this database that may be relevant to
the present study. First, it represents only the long side of investors’ portfolios These authors
claim that this limitation may not be very severe. Second, only large positions in excess of
10,000 shares or $200,000 are required to be disclosed in 13(f) fillings. Third, since investors
are required to file these reports only once a quarter, short-term trades may not be reflected
in these filings. Finally, institutional investors may exhibit signs of industry herding when
individual money managers within a larger institution collectively tilt their portfolio toward a
particular industry. Thus, these data are not much helpful in investigating herding behavior
among individual money managers.
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discretionary management. The Thomson Reuters database has 115 of such in-
vestors.
Figure 1 exhibits the total 13(f) value held by all and these 115 investors. As
the figure demonstrates, at the peak of the dot-com bubble in mid-2007 the joint
portfolio of all 13(f) filers was worth $15.4 trillion. At the same time, the size of
the joint portfolio of the 115 investors was about $3.9 trillion, or 25% of the total
13(f) portfolio. During the sample period between 1980 and 2012, investors in our
sample held between 14.3% and 29% of the cumulative 13(f) portfolio.
Figure 2 exhibits the total 13(f) value held by the investors in our sample and
the size and share of their collective long portfolio held in technology stocks.12As
the graph also shows, starting in 1997, the share of the collective portfolio held by
the 115 investors in technology stocks started diverging from its long-run trend and
then, as the dot-com bubble collapsed in the early 2000s, reversed back toward the
trend. This unusual behavior of the portfolio share invested in technology stocks is
perhaps one of the most obvious manifestations of the dot-com bubble in our data.
The current study examines the temporal relationship between the aggregate and
individual investor portfolio shares invested in technology stocks. The share of the
aggregate portfolio that the 115 large investors had collectively invested over time
in technology stocks appears as a solid line on Figure 2. As it can be seen from
the figure, this variable can be modeled as a trend-stationary process with a single
temporary shift in the intercept regime that occurred between 1997 and 2002. To
demonstrate this point, we detrend this variable13 and estimate the parameters in
the following univariate Markov-switching model with no autoregressive dynamics:
yM,t = µrt + εM,t (1)
12The Thomson Reuters database provides industry classifications for each portfolio stock hold-
ing in the 13(f) database. We consider all common stocks with industry codes in Computer
Hardware, Software & Services, and Telecommunications as technology stocks.
13We obtain detrended series by first estimating the following regression equation xM,t = α+βt+
γM,t, where xM,t is the share of the market portfolio invested in technology stocks, t is a time
index, and γM,t is the residual term. We then obtain the estimated residuals yM,t = xM,t−α̂−β̂t
that represent the detrended share of the market portfolio held in technology stocks.
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Here yM is the detrended share of the collective market portfolio invested by the
115 investors in technology stocks. The intercept term, µrt , can be interpreted as
the detrended mean share of portfolio invested in these stocks. The model allows
this mean to be in one of the two regimes, low (l) and high (h). Thus r = {l, h}.
We assume that the innovation term is an i.i.d., zero-mean process with Markov-
switching heteroscedasticity. The standard deviation of εM , σrM , may also assume
two regimes (l) and high (h).14 We estimate equation (1) and the smoothed regime
probabilities using the procedures outlined in Hamilton (1994) and Kim and Nelson
(1999). Our estimates of the intercepts are µl = −1.40 and µh = 10.36. Using these
intercepts and the regime smoothed probabilities, we also obtained the conditional
detrended mean portfolio share invested in technology stocks.15 Figure 3 exhibits
this fitted mean and the share of the collective portfolio invested in the technology
sector. The graph suggests that the estimated conditional mean does a decent job
in tracking the rise and fall of the actual collective investment in the technology
sector.
To establish whether the investment in technology stocks of each investor in our
sample followed that of others, we would like to determine whether the portfolio
share that each investor held in technology stocks also experienced regime shifts
during the dot-com bubble and if so, whether the shifts led, coincided, or lagged
the shift in the market portfolio of the remaining 114 investors. If the shifts in
a given investor’s portfolio occurred after the shift in the market portfolio, then
we can conclude that the investor followed the market and therefore herded into
and/or out of the bubble. This simple idea is closely related to one important
aspect of our methodology, offering a justification for why it is acceptable for us to
rely on the portfolio share as a metric of an investor’s involvement in technology
sector investment. Even if the investor did not purchase any additional technology
14We allow for Markov-switching heteroscedasticity in the model because our preliminary analysis
of the residuals from the homoscedastic model indicated significant deviations from normality.
The problem is greatly remedied when Markov-switching heteroscedasticity is allowed.
15More specifically, we obtain the conditional mean for any period t by applying the following
formula: µl × P(rt = l|=T ) + µh × P(rt = h|=T ) where P(rt = l|=T ) and P(rt = h|=T ) are the
smoothed probabilities that yM,t is in the low and high regime respectively.
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stocks as the bubble matured, the portfolio share invested in these stocks would
have automatically shifted upward as technology stocks appreciated. This upward
shift, however, would have occurred simultaneously with the rest of the market and
we would not classify this investor as having herded. Thus, whether the investor
shifted the portfolio simultaneously with the market or did not shift it at all, we
are likely to conclude that the investor did not herd. Only when the shift in the
investor’s portfolio occurred after that of the residual market, can we conclude that
the investor herded. The same logic can be applied when there is a downshift in the
market and when the investor leads the market.
We will examine the interplay between a given investor’s technology-stock holdings
and that of the remaining market of 114 investors by using a version of the vector
Markov-switching model employed by Hamilton and Lin (1996), Smith et al. (2000),
and Balagyozyan et al. (2015). This model allows for structural shifts in both
variables and is capable of revealing the lead and lag relationships between them.
For each investor in our sample, we estimate the following two-regime vector Markov-
switching model with no autoregressive dynamics:
yi,t = δst + εi,t
yM,t = µrt + εM,t
(2)
Here yi,t and yM,t are the shares of the portfolio that i-th investor and the remaining
market, consisting of 114 investors, invested at time t in technology stocks. Inter-
cepts δst and µrt are allowed to vary with time and subject to discrete Markov-switches
between two regimes: low (l) and high (h), hence r, s = {l, h}. We assume that the
innovation terms εM,t and εi,t are correlated processes with zero mean, time-varying
Markov-switching heteroscedasticity, and the correlation coefficient ρ. Hence, the
variance-covariance matrix of the innovation terms is given by:
Σt =
 (σsi )2 ρσsiσrM
ρσsiσ
r
M (σrM)2
 (3)
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Superscripts s and r in (3) represent heteroscedasticity regimes that can again as-
sume low (l) and high (h) values.
There are at least two reasons why we do not include any autoregressive or moving-
average dynamics in our model specified above. The first reason is uniformity. Esti-
mating the same model for every investor allows us to freely compare the estimated
parameters and test results across different investors. If we have to estimate the
same model for all investors, then the most parsimonious alternative is likely to be
a suitable choice. The second reason is interpretabilty. When the model has no AR
or MA components, the intercept terms in the model can be easily interpreted as
the mean portfolio shares invested in technology stocks. Interpretation of these co-
efficients becomes more cumbersome when AR and MA components are introduced.
Because one of the goals of this study is to introduce a novel approach of gauging
herding, rather than to provide the reader with carefully crafted forecasts, we feel
that the most parsimonious model is our best alternative.
Since both δs and µr can be in one of the two regimes, low (l) or high (h), they
can jointly assume one of the following four regimes:
R1 = {δl, µl}
R2 = {δl, µh} (4)
R3 = {δh, µl}
R4 = {δh, µh}
Regimes in (4) are not directly observable.16 However, if we assume that they follow
a Markov process, inferences about regimes, their probabilities,17 and transition
probabilities can be made using the procedures described in Hamilton (1994), Kim
and Nelson (1999), and Krolzig (1997).
16We restrict the shifts in variance regimes to occur only concurrently with the shifts in intercept
regimes. This in turn implies that we are able to describe the universe of all regimes by the
intercept terms alone.
17Smoothed, predicted, and filtered
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Shifts between the four regimes in (4) are described by a 4×4 transition probability
matrix that we estimate along with the other parameters of model (2)-(3). The
matrix is:
P =

p11 p21 p31 p41
p12 p22 p32 p42
p13 p23 p33 p43
p14 p24 p34 p44

(5)
where pqk = Pr(Rqt |Rkt−1), q, k = 1...4 is the transition probability that the regime
Rk is followed by regime Rq. Because the transition probability matrix (5) already
incorporates the temporal interdependency that may exist between the technology
stock holding of an investor and that of the market, we assume that the transition
probabilities are time invariant. Since each column of the transition probability
matrix must add to unity, we need to estimate only twelve probabilities of the
matrix.
Hamilton (1990) offers an appealing interpretation of the estimates of transition
probabilities: the estimated transition probability p̂qk is the number of times regime
q was followed by regime k, expressed as a percentage of the times when the process
was in regime q. For example, p̂24 can be interpreted as the relative frequency that
regime R2 with a low amount of technology stocks held by a given investor and a
high amount of these stocks held by the market (δl, µh) was followed by regime R4
with high amount of technology stocks held by both the investor and market (δh,
µh). If the estimate of this probability is significant, then we can infer that it is
likely that the investor followed the market, shifting technology stock holdings from
low to high, and therefore herded as the dot-com bubble matured.
The elements of the transition probability matrix (5) can capture all the possible
variations of the joint dynamics between the technology stock holdings of the market
and investor. We need to be careful in interpreting various transition probability
terms; for example consider the more explicit version of the transition probability
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matrix (5):
P =

P (δlt, µlt|δlt−1, µlt−1) P (δlt, µlt|δlt−1, µht−1) P (δlt, µlt|δht−1, µlt−1) P (δlt, µlt|δht−1, µht−1)
P (δlt, µht |δlt−1, µlt−1) P (δlt, µht |δlt−1, µht−1) P (δlt, µht |δht−1, µlt−1) P (δlt, µht |δht−1, µht−1)
P (δht , µlt|δlt−1, µlt−1) P (δht , µlt|δlt−1, µht−1) P (δht , µlt|δht−1, µlt−1) P (δht , µlt|δht−1, µht−1)
P (δht , µht |δlt−1, µlt−1) P (δht , µht |δlt−1, µht−1) P (δht , µht |δht−1, µlt−1) P (δht , µht |δht−1, µht−1)

(6)
If a given investor followed the market and therefore herded when the dot-com
bubble collapsed, then one would expect to estimate significant probability p31 =
P (δlt, µlt|δht−1, µlt−1). Even though this assertion may be appealing at first, in the
context of our data it may be misleading. Similar to the observation presented
in Figure 3, the yM,t series for every investor in our sample has a single spike in
the late 1990s. In contrast, the yi,t series for several investors has several spikes
and consequent downshifts of the regime. For these investors, shifts from regime
R3 = {δh, µl} to regime R1 = {δl, µl} occurred more than once, and as a result, we
would expect to estimate significant p31 = P (δlt, µlt|δht−1, µlt−1) even if the investor
did not follow the market when the dot-com bubble collapsed. Figure 4 exhibits
one such investor. The top panel of the figure exhibits the share of the portfolio
that Investor #3 held in technology stocks,18 while the bottom panel exhibits this
share for the residual market of the remaining 114 investors. As the figure shows,
there were several instances when the investor’s investment in technology stocks
shifted downward when the market holding of these stocks was in a low regime.
The estimate of p31 for this investor in particular is significant, even though the
investor did not appear to follow the market when the dot-com bubble collapsed in
the early 2000s. To circumvent this problem, we instead examine another transition
probability, p43 = P (δht , µlt|δht−1, µht−1). If the estimate of this probability is signifi-
cant, then it is likely that the downshift in the market holding of technology stocks
occurred before that of the investor. Between 1980 and 2012, the yM,t series for
every investor downshifted only once when the dot-com bubble collapsed, therefore,
18To maintain anonymity of investors in our sample, we randomly assigned a number to each.
Here and in the rest of the paper, we refer to the investors by this number.
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the significance of this probability most likely implies that the investor followed the
market on the downshift when the technology bubble collapsed in the early 2000s.19
The interpretations above suggest that if a given investor shifted her portfolio
toward technology stocks only after a similar shift occurred among other market
participants, then the investor herded during the buildup of the dot-com bubble
and we should be able to reject the hypothesis A: HA0 : p24 = 0. Similarly, the
rejection of the hypothesis B, HB0 : p43 = 0 implies that the shift in the investor’s
portfolio away from technology stocks occurred only after a similar shift occurred
among market participants. If this is the case, then the investor exhibited herding
behavior during the collapse of the dot-come bubble.
Applying similar logic, we analyzed the remaining elements of the the transition
probability matrix (6). Two other transition probabilities are of particular interest:
p34 = P (δht , µht |δht−1, µlt−1) and p21 = P (δlt, µlt|δlt−1, µht−1). If a given investor led the
market and moved toward technology stocks before other market participants did
during the dot-com bubble buildup, then we should be able to reject the hypothesis
C, HC0 : p34 = 0. Similarly, the rejection of the hypothesis D, HD0 : p21 = 0 implies
that the investor led the market during the collapse of the the bubble and started
divesting technology stocks before other market participants did. Thus, for each
investor in our sample we can test each of the hypotheses A, B , C, and D, and
based on the outcomes of these four tests place the investor in one of possible sixteen
categories. These sixteen categories are summarized in Table 2.
While Table 2 is self-explanatory, two features of the table are noteworthy. First,
it may seem that Categories 7, 10, and 12-16 are practically impossible. For example,
how can an investor in Category 7 at the same time lead and herd into the market
during the boom? In practice, this kind of outcome is possible if the investor led the
market during the initial buildup of the bubble, then, while the market bubble was
19There is the possibility that even after the dot-com bubble collapsed, the investor never down-
shifted its technology stock holdings. In those cases, it would be inappropriate to label the
investor as having herded during the downshift of the market since the investor did not follow
the market after the downshift. However, there are only a few such cases and we manually
placed them in the appropriate category. We give more detailed explanation of these cases in
the Results section of the paper.
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maturing, reduced and then shortly thereafter increased the technology stock hold-
ing. This investor at the same time led and followed the market. For this investor,
the estimates of both p34 = P (δht , µht |δht−1, µlt−1) and p21 = P (δht , µht |δlt−1, µht−1) must
be statistically different than zero, and as a result, we reject both hypotheses A
and C and place the investor in Category 7. While these outcomes are possible in
reality, we would be unable to unambiguously classify the investors in these seven
categories as having herded or not. Thus, if our tests place any of the investors in
our sample into one of these seven categories, we will consider those investors as
belonging to a separate category that we label as uncategorized.
The second noteworthy feature of Table 2 is that there can be some investors
for whom we do not reject either or both pairs of hypothesis, A and C and B or
D. These investors will fall into one of the categories 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 10. For
example, our inability to reject hypotheses A and C for a given investor would mean
that during the buildup of the dot-com bubble, the investor neither led nor followed
the others. Such outcome is possible if the investor’s technology portfolio either
coincided or had no statistical resemblance with the market technology portfolio.
In either case, we label the investor as not having herded during the buildup of the
bubble. Similarly, if for a given investor we are unable to reject both hypotheses B
and D, we conclude that the investor did not herd during the collapse of the bubble.
For each investor in our sample, we estimated the 21 parameters20 of the unre-
stricted model (2) using MLE. In this process, we enforced the constraints δl < δh
and µl < µh. We also obtain numerical standard errors of the intercept and corre-
lation coefficients. We used the likelihood ratio test to test each of the hypotheses
A, B, C, and D for each investor in the sample. Since each test imposes only one
restriction on the transition probability matrix, the likelihood ratio statistics has
a χ2 distribution with one degree of freedom. We tested these hypotheses at 5%
significance level.
20δh, δl, µh, µl, σhi , σli, σhM ,σlM , ρ plus 12 transition probabilities in (5)
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III. Results
For each investor in our sample of 115, we estimated the vector Markov-switching
autoregressive model in (2). The model estimates of regression parameters are pre-
sented in Table 1. For each investor we also tested each of the hypotheses A, B, C,
and D, and based on the outcomes of all four tests, placed each investor in one of the
sixteen categories summarized in Table 2. As we mentioned in Section II, the model
may reject hypothesis B for some investors that at least for a while after the col-
lapse of the bubble did not reduce their technology stock holdings and therefore did
not in fact herd during the collapse of the bubble. Figure 5 exhibits the detrended
technology stock holding of one such investor and the corresponding market series.
If no special care is given to the investors in this group, we may end up erroneously
classifying some of them as having herded during the collapse of the bubble. There
are 14 investors for whom the model rejected hypothesis B. We manually screened
the technology stock holdings of these 14 investors and found that 7 of them (similar
to Investor #35 in Figure 5) did not reduce their technology stock holdings for at
least 5 years after the collapse of the dot-com bubble. For these 7 investors, we
manually overrode the Test B results from reject (1) to do not reject (0). For the
remaining 7 investors we retained Test B rejection.
As we also mentioned in Section II, it is impossible for us to unambiguously
classify any of the investors who ended up in test categories 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15,
and 16. Our test results reveal that there were six of such investors: one in each
of the categories 7 and 10 and two in each of the categories 14 and 16. Since we
are unable to unambiguously identify the herding patterns of these six investors, we
labeled them as uncategorized.
Table 3 presents the overall aggregate counts and percentages of investors for
whom we rejected each of the hypotheses. As these numbers indicate, the largest
group among investors is the one for which we rejected hypothesis D. Twenty-seven
out of 115 investors in our sample (or about 24%) shifted away from technology
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stocks before the remaining market did. At the same time, 18 (or about 16%) of the
investors exhibited herding behavior (for whom we rejected hypothesis A) during
the buildup to the bubble. There were 8 investors or 7% that led the market and
moved toward the technology sector before the bubble started maturing (for whom
we rejected hypothesis C). Finally, there was only a relatively small group of 4
investors (or about 4%) that herded during the collapse of the bubble (for whom
we rejected hypothesis B). The primary message that emerges from these results
is that investors were significantly more likely to herd during the buildup to the
dot-com bubble than during the collapse. The fact that about a quarter of the
investors exited the technology sector before the bubble collapsed implies that there
was a large group of investors who anticipated the collapse. At the same time, a
large group of investors jumped onto and rode on the technology bubble only after
it took off in the late 1990s. These results are in strong agreement with the findings
of Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and Griffin et al. (2011) and appear to suggest
that a large number of investors were well aware of the bubble and, as Abreu and
Brunnermeier’s (2009) hypothesis would predict, rode on it before it collapsed.
Table 4 presents a more detailed accounting of the test results. In what follows, we
will describe and present particular examples of investors in different categories listed
in this table. Category 1 is the modal group, including 63 or 54.8 % of investors.
For these investors, the model did not lead to a rejection of either hypotheses. This
means that investors in this category did not herd into or out of nor lead the the dot-
com bubble. This category consists of two types of investors. The first, predominant
group is the investors whose technology investment regimes coincided with that of
the residual market.21 The top panel of Figure 6 exhibits the technology stock
holding of one such investor (Investor #1). These investors moved in and out of the
technology sector simultaneously with the rest of the market. The second, smaller
subgroup consists of a few investors22 whose technology investment regimes have no
21We manually examine the graphs of technology portfolio holdings of all 63 Category 1 investors
and find that there are about 54 of such investors.
22We count 9 of such investors.
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visual commonality with that of the rest of the sample market. Figure 7 demonstrate
the technology holding of Investor #97 who is in this group. Regardless of the type,
more than one half of the investors in our sample neither herded into or out of nor
led the dot-com bubble.
The second largest group in Table 2 is the investors in Category 5. The 18
investors in this group that constituted nearly 16% of our sample did not follow nor
led the technology flock during the buildup but led it before the bubble collapsed;
they exited the technology sector before the other market participants did. Figure 8
exhibits Investor #51 that happened to be in this group. This result again suggests
that regardless of herding behavior during the formation of the bubble, a significant
number of investors probably were aware of and anticipated the end of the bubble.
The 12 investors or 10.4% of the sample that herded during the buildup to the
bubble (Category 2) constitute the third largest category. One representative in-
vestor from this group is displayed in Figure 9. As the figure makes it clear, Investor
#79 shifted toward technology stocks (the upper panel) only after the rest of the
market did (the lower panel).
These top three categories make up more than 80% of our sample. By considering
these three categories alone, one can already see the take-home message that adds
to our previous conclusion: by and large investors did not lead nor lag the technol-
ogy market during the boom and bust phases of the dot-com bubble (Category 1).
Moreover, even if there was some degree of herding, most of it took place during the
buildup to the bubble rather than collapse (Categories 2). Finally, a relatively large
number of institutional investors in our sample exited from the technology sector
before the bubble collapsed (Category 5).
The numbers of investors in the less populous categories 11, 8, 4, 6, 3, and 9 were
5, 4, 3, 2, 2, and 0 respectively. Each of the figures 10-13 shows the technology stock
holding regimes of one representative investor in Categories 11, 8, 4, 6.
In order to exhibit a more comprehensive overview of our findings, we combined
all our test results into a single classification tree displayed on Figure 14. On the
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figure, we consider all those investors that herded during the boom or bust or both
phases of the bubble as having herded (the top branch of the the tree). Those
include investors in Categories 2 and 8 (that herded during the boom), investors
in categories 3 and 9 (that herded during the bust), and investors in Category
6 (that herded during both). Thus, there were only 20 investors out of 115 (or
17.5%) that according to our results herded. Again, herding among institutional
investors occurred asymmetrically during the boom and bust phases of the dot-com
bubble with most of herding occurring during the run-up of the bubble (16 + 2 = 18
investors) rather than collapse (only 2 + 2 = 4 investors). The graph also highlights
that there was not a single investor that has foreseen the buildup of the bubble and
later failed to predict the collapse (Category 9).
The middle branch of the tree on Figure 14 represents all those investors who did
not herd. Those include investors who either led or did not herd (Categories 1, 4,
5, and 11). Again, the largest sub-group among them is those who did not herd or
lead during the boom and bust of the cycle (Category 1). All together, 77.4% of our
sample investors did not exhibit any traces of herding.
Finally, for the 6 investors (5.2%) represented by the bottom branch of the tree,
we could not unambiguously conclude whether they have herded or not during the
dot-com bubble.
In addition to the earlier conclusions that we drew from the numbers in Table
3, the above discussion implies that during the dot-com bubble of the late 1990s,
herding among large institutional investors was not an pervasive phenomenon. The
investors that did neither led nor followed the market (Category 1) make up the
largest category of investors. It is hard to tell whether or not those investors were
aware of the bubble. It could very well be the case that they were, yet maybe
because of capital constraints, they did not invest against the bubble. This scenario
would still be consistent with Abreu and Brunnermeir’s (2003) hypothesis. Or it
could be the case that those investors simply remained agnostic about the bubble.
This would support the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Thus, as far as our data and
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conclusions are concerned, the fact that the technology stock portfolios of many
Category 1 investors coincided with the technology stock portfolio of the the market
can be attributed to either hypothesis. At the same time, however, the fact that
there was a sizable group of large institutional investors who rode on and then at the
right moment jumped off the technology bubble makes a strong case for the Abreu
and Brunnermeir’s (2003) hypothesis of rational bubbles.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
This paper used a novel approach to gauge whether large institutional investors
herded during the technology bubble of the late 1990s. By imposing various restric-
tions on the transition probability matrix in a vector Markov-switching model, we
were able to test for different lead/lag scenarios that might have existed between
technology stock holdings of each investor in our sample and that of the remaining
sample during the bubble. Our results indicate that a little more than three quar-
ters of the sample investors did not exhibit any signs of herding behavior. Most of
the investors in this group entered and exited the technology sector simultaneously
with the rest of the sample. About 23% of the sample investors exited the technol-
ogy sector before the bubble collapsed; in this phase of the bubble they led rather
than followed the technology herd. These results do not mean, however, that we
were unable to detect any traces of herding. About 14% of investors followed the
rest of the market during the buildup to the bubble, while only 2% herded as the
bubble collapsed. Thus, insofar as some traces of herding have been detected, most
herding among institutional investors occurred during the buildup rather than the
bust of the technology bubble. These results are in line with the results of Brun-
nermeier and Nagel (2004) and Griffin et al. (2011) and seem to support Abreu and
Brunnermeier’s (2003) hypothesis that asset bubbles are a coordination problem.
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Table 1. Estimates of the vector Markov-switching regression parameters
in (2) for each investor in the sample. Note: all intercept and correlation
coefficients in boldface are significant at the 5% significance level
Investor δl δh µl µh σlδ σhδ σlµ σhµ ρ
1 -2.19 19.29 -1.30 11.3 3.18 7.99 1.85 4.33 0.69
2 -3.34 8.99 -1.38 9.74 4.62 6.54 1.78 4.57 0.71
3 -2.74 3.68 -1.61 9.82 2.07 2.57 1.63 4.85 0.26
4 -1.64 1.85 -1.69 9.42 0.97 1.19 1.57 4.96 -0.14
5 -1.51 20.58 -1.49 11.03 6.13 8.83 1.69 4.68 0.69
6 -1.09 8.89 -1.37 9.89 2.46 4.25 1.72 4.58 0.32
7 -1.11 3.73 -1.48 9.94 2.74 2.33 1.67 4.66 -0.59
8 -2.12 2.98 -1.36 11.2 1.65 2.17 1.76 4.58 0.30
9 -2.01 5.62 -1.78 9.83 2.48 1.73 1.55 5.07 -0.39
10 -1.41 8.11 -1.71 9.97 2.83 2.95 1.67 4.90 0.80
11 -1.47 2.49 -1.11 12.96 2.58 2.22 2.09 4.08 0.80
12 -3.92 11.03 -2.21 6.05 3.52 5.90 1.69 5.29 0.80
13 -3.53 9.22 -1.59 6.27 3.43 7.28 1.61 4.87 0.82
14 -1.12 15.16 -1.93 10.25 4.15 5.22 1.65 5.26 -0.20
15 -0.69 5.26 -1.38 10.36 1.89 2.82 1.75 4.61 0.70
16 -1.73 29.54 -1.37 10.14 5.62 8.81 1.70 4.58 0.14
17 -1.33 6.32 -1.47 8.94 2.27 4.26 1.77 4.76 0.73
18 -1.55 6.30 -1.56 6.45 1.63 3.61 1.74 4.58 0.85
19 -3.78 1.33 -1.67 9.27 1.39 2.04 1.57 4.93 0.64
20 -1.09 8.69 -1.35 10.74 2.07 3.30 1.80 4.58 0.77
21 -3.42 2.13 -1.45 12.55 2.03 2.20 1.71 4.61 -0.45
22 -1.94 1.46 -1.40 6.05 1.54 1.80 1.76 4.80 0.83
23 -2.59 3.18 -1.34 8.67 2.65 1.60 1.73 4.63 -0.24
24 -1.46 9.07 -1.63 9.94 3.23 3.84 1.65 4.87 0.74
Continued on next page
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Investor δl δh µl µh σlδ σhδ σlµ σhµ ρ
25 -1.16 9.17 -1.35 10.73 1.93 3.79 1.79 4.58 0.72
26 -1.29 10.27 -1.35 10.66 2.25 4.14 1.81 4.52 0.88
27 -1.49 11.87 -1.35 10.63 3.10 5.46 1.80 4.57 0.74
28 -1.38 8.32 -1.69 10.43 2.22 4.14 1.66 5.00 0.43
29 -1.90 9.68 -1.98 10.06 2.89 4.99 1.93 4.66 0.75
30 -1.31 2.46 -1.67 7.71 2.38 2.95 1.59 4.83 0.74
31 -1.36 3.64 -1.88 7.36 2.69 1.57 1.79 4.93 0.71
32 -0.97 7.92 -1.34 10.76 2.1 3.08 1.81 4.58 0.69
33 -1.37 10.66 -1.36 10.51 2.08 4.20 1.73 4.58 0.80
34 -1.56 12.41 -1.39 9.93 3.48 4.90 1.76 4.58 0.51
35 -3.66 1.54 -1.32 9.57 0.88 1.35 1.71 4.57 0.30
36 -1.17 6.00 -1.36 10.20 2.12 2.8 1.70 4.58 0.29
37 -1.52 12.33 -1.76 10.21 3.06 3.86 1.64 5.00 0.49
38 -2.30 4.51 -1.30 7.70 2.99 4.22 1.71 4.62 0.86
39 -1.23 21.00 -1.54 10.75 7.23 5.12 1.70 4.8 0.11
40 -2.77 8.79 -1.46 7.43 2.60 5.76 1.67 4.78 0.60
41 -2.39 15.54 -1.57 9.74 4.3 4.82 1.69 4.8 0.34
42 -2.03 11.75 -1.70 9.79 1.88 6.87 1.52 4.76 0.68
43 -1.17 8.81 -1.37 10.35 1.82 4.03 1.79 4.58 0.84
44 -1.68 10.43 -1.55 10.22 3.19 4.19 1.68 4.8 0.86
45 -3.43 2.64 -1.32 8.58 1.72 2.68 1.76 4.59 0.54
46 -3.72 4.03 -1.97 10.33 1.29 3.83 1.68 5.31 0.16
47 -1.87 7.61 -1.46 8.69 4.94 5.57 1.71 4.68 0.87
48 -5.40 5.00 -1.69 7.38 3.39 2.44 1.61 4.59 -0.67
49 -1.17 9.31 -1.33 10.92 2.02 3.99 1.81 4.58 0.63
50 -2.90 16.43 -2.29 9.45 7.41 6.24 1.85 5.38 0.74
Continued on next page
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Investor δl δh µl µh σlδ σhδ σlµ σhµ ρ
51 -0.43 5.87 -1.40 10.20 1.22 1.84 1.69 4.61 0.17
52 -1.56 9.85 -1.66 10.50 1.62 4.05 1.70 4.69 0.93
53 -1.29 5.28 -1.37 10.05 3.08 3.44 1.71 4.59 0.10
54 -2.48 2.62 -1.43 9.71 1.06 1.88 1.68 4.63 0.18
55 -5.31 9.83 -1.43 8.55 2.94 6.84 1.78 4.68 0.63
56 -4.19 25.94 -1.49 8.97 5.01 8.04 1.64 4.53 0.72
57 -3.45 6.28 -1.39 4.82 2.64 6.15 1.72 4.58 0.75
58 -1.96 6.54 -1.62 6.46 2.15 2.93 1.74 4.78 0.75
59 -1.63 3.25 -1.42 11.52 1.97 1.92 1.74 4.60 0.60
60 -1.43 8.51 -1.66 9.18 2.34 4.94 1.62 4.94 0.85
61 -0.20 0.35 -1.35 10.83 0.15 0.31 1.76 4.57 -0.41
62 -1.06 5.25 -1.28 8.65 2.46 3.05 1.71 4.58 0.85
63 -0.74 12.20 -1.31 10.74 2.80 4.33 1.78 4.59 0.15
64 -1.00 3.40 -1.65 5.47 1.51 3.56 1.77 4.66 0.84
65 -1.87 10.93 -1.78 8.07 4.09 5.32 1.69 4.96 0.78
66 -0.24 31.51 -1.39 10.31 5.12 0.01 1.70 4.59 -0.39
67 -1.47 11.51 -1.37 10.32 3.64 3.96 1.77 4.58 0.54
68 -2.05 4.78 -1.41 10.14 1.94 3.64 1.72 4.70 0.17
69 -3.33 13.26 -1.49 5.87 3.77 5.88 1.82 4.48 0.83
70 -5.47 3.89 -1.25 5.62 2.15 6.29 1.93 4.78 0.77
71 -1.35 10.40 -1.35 10.64 2.44 4.05 1.80 4.58 0.84
72 -1.32 1.67 -1.48 10.09 0.73 1.32 1.84 4.20 0.65
73 -4.43 2.51 -1.58 8.49 2.32 3.16 1.77 4.40 0.80
74 -4.06 6.19 -1.40 9.86 3.27 4.46 1.71 4.59 0.24
75 -1.54 12.20 -1.37 9.98 2.77 5.73 1.79 4.57 0.77
76 -2.12 7.18 -1.54 9.32 2.64 4.99 1.72 4.86 0.54
Continued on next page
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Investor δl δh µl µh σlδ σhδ σlµ σhµ ρ
77 -5.55 1.42 -1.68 10.13 1.46 3.00 1.59 4.94 0.01
78 -1.13 8.64 -1.37 10.45 1.6 3.57 1.78 4.59 0.76
79 -1.91 17.24 -1.47 8.66 2.20 6.70 1.63 4.77 0.45
80 -2.82 14.08 -1.89 9.36 4.37 5.75 1.84 5.14 0.86
81 -1.08 8.45 -1.35 10.72 2.47 3.83 1.79 4.59 0.54
82 -1.23 7.85 -1.57 9.96 1.59 3.51 1.74 4.81 0.77
83 -1.34 8.24 -1.71 10.21 2.03 3.61 1.61 5.00 0.19
84 -1.08 8.53 -1.36 10.51 2.56 2.70 1.79 4.58 0.70
85 -1.20 9.37 -1.37 10.63 2.00 4.20 1.79 4.60 0.87
86 -1.51 3.46 -1.70 9.67 1.45 2.23 1.63 4.96 0.44
87 -2.21 11.47 -1.35 7.69 2.39 6.14 1.76 4.44 0.75
88 -2.11 3.13 -1.49 10.90 1.65 1.95 1.68 4.70 -0.23
89 -4.70 10.77 -1.61 8.35 4.27 4.65 1.60 4.86 -0.45
90 -1.60 15.56 -1.34 2.28 7.23 5.84 1.07 5.38 0.57
91 -1.07 2.18 -1.29 9.71 0.73 1.84 1.67 4.58 -0.56
92 -2.66 2.35 -1.47 3.68 1.08 2.22 1.62 4.60 0.75
93 -6.76 9.97 -1.38 10.29 2.24 12.83 1.70 4.58 -0.14
94 -2.32 14.10 -1.68 9.78 5.33 5.98 1.63 4.94 0.64
95 -1.73 1.96 -1.63 8.90 1.29 1.37 1.57 4.85 -0.34
96 -2.04 28.65 -1.33 10.35 4.56 10.02 1.74 4.57 0.28
97 -3.34 2.10 -1.83 8.26 2.06 3.20 1.61 5.17 0.54
98 -7.07 9.35 -1.58 7.74 6.39 5.82 1.61 4.91 -0.47
99 -3.55 6.35 -2.09 3.03 2.62 7.34 1.31 4.91 0.85
100 -0.14 14.12 -1.49 10.08 3.52 0.01 1.69 4.78 -0.12
101 -2.84 1.77 -1.51 7.01 1.13 2.42 1.74 4.85 0.66
102 -1.27 15.64 -1.33 9.69 5.43 6.13 1.72 4.58 0.49
Continued on next page
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Investor δl δh µl µh σlδ σhδ σlµ σhµ ρ
103 -2.15 16.63 -1.36 10.49 4.98 6.23 1.77 4.56 0.71
104 -1.41 10.54 -1.44 10.58 2.15 4.00 1.82 4.63 0.77
105 -0.87 6.29 -1.42 10.46 2.24 3.40 1.71 4.66 0.70
106 -5.64 7.47 -1.52 8.70 2.29 4.18 1.63 4.91 0.39
107 -2.78 1.92 -1.57 9.48 0.51 2.88 1.65 4.8 -0.38
108 -0.45 4.30 -1.43 10.04 2.85 1.99 1.72 4.58 0.32
109 -1.68 16.09 -1.52 9.36 3.59 4.15 1.67 4.79 0.38
110 -2.21 5.42 -1.60 10.29 2.42 2.98 1.63 4.83 0.10
111 -1.23 5.43 -1.34 8.52 2.20 3.74 1.75 4.38 0.85
112 -0.82 5.06 -1.53 6.72 2.09 3.02 1.75 4.67 0.88
113 -2.05 13.64 -1.54 9.58 4.52 4.55 1.70 4.77 0.71
114 -5.05 3.11 -1.73 9.55 1.41 2.87 1.58 5.01 0.10
115 -1.52 10.46 -1.41 9.56 2.13 3.82 1.75 4.58 0.78
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Table 2. Depending on the outcome of tests A, B, C, and D (1 = reject and
0 = do not reject), each investor falls into one of the sixteen categories.
Each category uniquely describes whether the investor herded or led the
market during the buildup or collapse of the dot-com bubble.
Category Reject Hypothesis Description
A B C D Boom Bust
1 0 0 0 0 did not herd did not lead did not herd did not lead
2 1 0 0 0 herded did not lead did not herd did not lead
3 0 1 0 0 did not herd did not lead herded did not lead
4 0 0 1 0 did not herd led did not herd did not lead
5 0 0 0 1 did not herd did not lead did not herd led
6 1 1 0 0 herded did not lead herded did not lead
7 1 0 1 0 herded led did not herd did not lead
8 1 0 0 1 herded did not lead did not herd led
9 0 1 1 0 did not herd led herded did not lead
10 0 1 0 1 did not herd did not lead herded led
11 0 0 1 1 did not herd led did not herd led
12 1 1 1 0 herded led herded did not lead
13 1 1 0 1 herded did not lead herded led
14 1 0 1 1 herded led did not herd led
15 0 1 1 1 did not herd led herded led
16 1 1 1 1 herded led herded led
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Table 3. Counts and percentages of the sample (115) investors for whom
each of the four hypotheses are rejected. The numbers in the table ex-
clude investors in unclassified Categories 7, 10, 12-16.
Herded during the boom Herded during the bust Led during the boom Led during the bust
Reject HA0 Reject HB0 Reject HC0 Reject HD0
# 18 4 8 27
% 15.7% 3.5% 7.0% 23.5%
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Table 4. Counts and percentages of the sample (115) investors in each
test category ranked by the category size. The table excludes unclassified
categories 7, 10, 12-16.
Category Description Count Percentage
Boom Bust
1 did not herd, did not lead did not herd, did not lead 63 54.8%
5 did not herd, did not lead did not herd, led 18 15.7%
2 herded, did nor lead did not herd, did not lead 12 10.4%
11 did not herd, led did not herd, led 5 4.3%
8 herded, did not lead did not herd, led 4 3.5%
4 did not herd, led did not herd, did not lead 3 2.6%
6 herded, did not lead herded, did not lead 2 1.7%
3 did not herd, did not lead herded, did not lead 2 1.7%
9 did not herd, led herded, did not lead 0 0.0%
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Figure 1. Total 13(f) value held by all and the 115 managers in our sample
(right axis, in trillions) and the percentage of the cumulative portfolio
held by the 115 managers in our sample (left axis).
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Figure 2. Value held by the 115 managers in all and technology stocks
(right axis, in billions) and the share of the portfolio held by the 115
investors in technology stocks (left axis).
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Figure 3. Share of the collective portfolio held by 115 investors in tech-
nology stocks and the Markov-switching conditional detrended mean of
the series.
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Figure 4. Technology stock holding of Investor #3 (upper panel) and of
the residual market (lower panel). The smooth lines on both graphs are
the conditional detrended means of the respective series.
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Figure 5. Technology stock holding of Investor #35 (upper panel) and of
the residual market (lower panel). The smooth lines on both graphs are
the conditional detrended means of the respective series.
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Figure 6. Technology stock holding of Investor #1 (upper panel) in Cate-
gory 1 (did not herd & did not lead the market). The lower panel exhibits
the technology stock holding of the residual market. The smooth lines on
both graphs are the conditional detrended means of the respective series.
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Figure 7. Technology stock holding of Investor #97 (upper panel) in Cate-
gory 1 (did not herd & did not lead the market). The lower panel exhibits
the technology stock holding of the residual market. The smooth lines on
both graphs are the conditional detrended means of the respective series.
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Figure 8. Technology stock holding of Investor #51 (upper panel) in
Category 5 (led the market during the bust). The lower panel exhibits
the technology stock holding of the residual market. The smooth lines on
both graphs are the conditional detrended means of the respective series.
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Figure 9. Technology stock holding of Investor #79 (upper panel) in
Category 2 (herded during the boom). The lower panel exhibits the
technology stock holding of the residual market. The smooth lines on
both graphs are the conditional detrended means of the respective series.
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Figure 10. Technology stock holding of Investor #36 (upper panel) in
Category 11 (led the market during the boom and bust). The lower
panel exhibits the technology stock holding of the residual market. The
smooth lines on both graphs are the conditional detrended means of the
respective series.
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Figure 11. Technology stock holding of Investor #14 (upper panel) in
Category 8 (herded during the boom & led the market during the bust).
The lower panel exhibits the technology stock holding of the residual
market. The smooth lines on both graphs are the conditional detrended
means of the respective series.
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Figure 12. Technology stock holding of Investor #40 (upper panel) in
Category 4 (led the market during the boom). The lower panel exhibits
the technology stock holding of the residual market. The smooth lines on
both graphs are the conditional detrended means of the respective series.
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Figure 13. Technology stock holding of Investor #9 (upper panel) in
Category 6 (herded during the boom and bust). The lower panel exhibits
the technology stock holding of the residual market. The smooth lines on
both graphs are the conditional detrended means of the respective series.
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Figure 14. Breakdown of the sample investors between different test cat-
egories and relevant groups. The numbers at the bottom of each box
represent the number and percentage of all sample investors within the
group.
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